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A B S T R A C T
Forensic scientists around the world are adopting new technology platforms capable of efficiently analysing a
larger proportion of the human genome. Undertaking this analysis could provide significant operational benefits,
particularly in giving investigators more information about the donor of genetic material, a particularly useful
investigative lead. Such information could include predicting externally visible characteristics such as eye and
hair colour, as well as biogeographical ancestry. This article looks at the adoption of this new technology from
a privacy perspective, using this to inform and critique the application of a Privacy Impact Assessment to this
emerging technology. Noting the benefits and limitations, the article develops a number of themes that would
influence a model Privacy Impact Assessment as a contextual framework for forensic laboratories and law en-
forcement agencies considering implementing forensic DNA phenotyping for operational use.
1. The privacy challenges of genetic information
With the advent of massively parallel sequencing (MPS), forensic
laboratories can undertake more cost-effective analysis of informative
parts of the human genome [1]. This is a major shift from current foren-
sic DNA practice, which is focused on repetitive elements of DNA suffi-
cient to estimate probabilities that different DNA samples have the same
origin. In the context of forensic science, these capabilities would al-
low analysis of genetic material deposited by an individual at a crime
scene and for probabilistic predictions to be made to inform law en-
forcement about possible attributes of the donor. This capability, re-
ferred to as forensic DNA phenotyping, is currently targeted at predict-
ing biogeographical ancestry (BGA) and externally visible characteris-
tics (EVCs), such as hair and eye colour [2,3]. Forensic DNA phenotyp-
ing could also soon be used to predict other donor traits, including male
pattern baldness, biological age and fingerprints [4–6]. It could even be
used to predict predisposition to certain diseases, for which they may be
seeking medical treatment, or behavioural traits [7].
There are strong public policy grounds for using forensic science to
assist law enforcement agencies to apprehend offenders. However, in
addition to ensuring that new technology is scientifically sound, peer re-
viewed and quantifiable in terms of its error rate [8,9], the public in
terest must also be balanced against detriment to personal privacy. Ge-
netic privacy is an important ethical issue, andaw enforcement agencies
must also establish and maintain public confidence and trust in capabil-
ities likely to intrude on the privacy rights of individuals or groups, or
risk public criticism [10,11].
Historically, forensic DNA profiling has exploited medical testing
capabilities, with the associated public policy discussions touching on
medico-ethical issues of bodily integrity and privacy [12,13]. With
forensic DNA phenotyping, it is necessary to further contextualise the
operational capability within a more widely, ethically-informed privacy
framework.
In broad terms, any exploitation of the human genome – particularly
without the informed consent of the donor – presents a number of in-
herent risks. In the case of forensic DNA phenotyping, these can be cat-
egorised as:
1. Harm arising from the use or disclosure of predictive information
generated to assist law enforcement. An example could be an individ-
ual becoming aware that their predicted BGA does not match their
beliefs, based on their own cultural or familial self-identity [14].
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2. Ancillary information which could be derived from the predictive in-
formation described above. An example could be release of genetic
marker information which, at a future time, is found to predict an in-
dividual’s health status.
Writing about whole genome sequencing, the Presidential Commis-
sion for the Study of Bioethical Issues [15] noted that:
Strong baseline privacy protections require a spectrum of poli-
cies starting with data handling through the protection of persons
from future disadvantage and discrimination…
The same report noted the balance between ‘public beneficence’ and
‘responsible stewardship’ by government, the need to respect the ‘dig-
nity and privacy’ of individuals and avoid ‘social stigma’, concluding
that whole genome sequencing ‘substantially raises the stakes of med-
ical information’ [15].
Gostin [16] argues that ‘[g]enomic data are qualitatively different
from other health data because they are inherently linked to one per-
son’, going on to describe them as ‘unchanging and unchangeable’ and
a breach of genomic privacy as potentially giving rise to ‘economic
harms, such as loss of employment, insurance, or housing’. Similar
themes can be found in the report of the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission, which noted that genetics deals with ‘possibilities rather than
certainties’, that ‘genetic information has a familial dimension’ and that
there are cultural sensitivities around kinship and identity [17]. In addi-
tion, groups can be stigmatised in a genetic context and there are [inher-
ent problems of confidentiality and informed consent when dealing with
genomic information in the context of informational privacy [18,19].
Widespread use of DNA databases began in the late-1990s with
agreement on specific genetic loci for DNA profiling [20]. These loci
were, at the time, thought not to be informative, or to consist of ‘junk
DNA’, and are used exclusively for identity, not phenotype prediction
(with the exception of the amelogenin sex-determining locus) [21]. The
notion that these loci are not informative for phenotypes has been chal-
lenged both in terms of functional genomics and in the context of the
broader privacy debate over law enforcement use of DNA [12,22,23].
In addition, Curtis [24] described research undertaken in 2009
which showed most respondents to a survey held concerns about sec-
ondary use of their genetic information, if provided to law enforcement.
Novas and Rose [25] explain that an individual’s genetic identity must
be placed in familial and societal contexts and a great deal of value
from genetic information comes from its family links and an ability to
compare genes between individuals [26]. The larger this body of ge-
netic knowledge, the more accurate our probabilistic predictions and
observations become and our ability to identify new phenotype-infor-
mative markers [20]. These familial and community links further com-
plicate our assessment of forensic genomics from a privacy and ethical
perspective, requiring us to approach the question of an adequate pri-
vacy framework holistically and with reference to broader community
concerns. For example, the potential for phenotype-based intelligence to
lead to prejudice against communities is a concern that is further exacer-
bated by the potential for particular populations to be overrepresented
in BGA predictive modelling [27,28].
Machado and Silva [29] compared ethical issues for medical
biobanks and forensic DNA profiling, identifying commonalities be-
tween them that underpin their success. Key to this was transparency
and accountability, the right to be informed and to provide consent
where feasible. Forensic DNA phenotyping will, in many ways, further
blur this distinction and require forensic scientists to learn from and
adapt approaches used in medical research and diagnostic fields. Pri-
vacy considerations align with community concerns about the potential
for DNA database capabilities to be used as a form of genetic surveil-
lance [30].
While acknowledging that there has been a privacy debate around
current forensic DNA practice, we do not seek to re-explore those issues
except where they are particularly agitated by the adoption of foren-
sic DNA phenotyping. The use of a small selection of DNA markers for
forensic identity testing has delivered a robust, generally privacy-com-
pliant system for more than twenty years. We instead seek to tease out
the differences between this approach (the baseline) and changes aris-
ing from forensic DNA phenotyping.
2. Privacy impact assessment as a policy response
When a generational change occurs in forensic technology, a prudent
service provider will seek legal advice as to any legislative impediments.
Such advice would likely identify the provider’s need to comply with
relevant privacy legislation.
Purely considering statutory obligations would not necessarily en-
sure engagement with broader issues of privacy norms: concepts that
may make a course of action lawful yet socially unacceptable [31,32].
In particular, Tene and Polonetsky noted the need to avoid privacy by
‘regulatory fiat’ and to embrace a ‘a nuanced and sophisticated path’
[31]. Clearly, a broader approach to privacy is required, with one exam-
ple being the use of privacy impact assessments (PIA). A PIA is a tech-
nique used to examine new capabilities or projects through a privacy
lens [33]. The requirement for, approach and content of a PIA varies
between countries. This discussion, therefore, is limited to the broader
concept with a view to informing a model PIA – a so-called ‘straw’ pol-
icy − that can be adapted to specific jurisdictional requirements. Such
an approach can assist in identifying privacy risks and placing technol-
ogy within a broader societal and technological context [34].
3. Approaches to a PIA
The use of a PIA is generally aligned to legal obligations on busi-
ness and agencies to implement policies and procedures to ensure com-
pliance with privacy laws. For example, the Australian Privacy Princi-
ples require an entity to ‘implement practices, procedures and systems’
to ensure privacy compliance. [35] The US Privacy Act requires agen-
cies to publish details of systems of records in the Federal Register.[36]
This approach, which encourages proactive consideration of potential
privacy risks, is known as ‘privacy by design’ [37], and works alongside
agencies’ existing risk management frameworks [38].
A PIA is intended to minimise any adverse impact on personal pri-
vacy or risks around the handling of personal data ‘while allowing the
aims of the project to be met whenever possible’, and considers both
positive and negative privacy impacts [38,39].
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) [38]
describes a ‘threshold assessment’ for a PIA, explaining that the process
may be unnecessary where:
the project does not propose any changes to existing information
handling practices, if the privacy implications of these practices
have been assessed previously and controls are current and work-
ing well.
Embarking on a PIA requires a careful assessment of its scope, how-
ever. In the context of forensic DNA phenotyping, the PIA must con-
sider the broader opportunities MPS presents to forensic science. It
is arguably inappropriate to employ a PIA threshold assessment that
merely addresses a technology upgrade and does not grapple with the
broader issues of maintaining public trust in forensic DNA, the shift to-
wards forensic genomics and concepts of ‘big data’ [40]. Equally im
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portant is to determine whether any PIA process should revisit broader
questions around law enforcement use of DNA, or accept – as a baseline
– some level of privacy intrusion as a necessary part of criminal justice
processes.
The process of conducting a PIA requires a detailed mapping of
how personal information will be collected, used and managed [38].
The United Kingdom Information Commissioner's Office [39] prescribes
wide consultation as an integral part of a PIA, alongside the required
analysis of local privacy laws and practice. A broad range of risk and
mitigation factors should be considered and the OAIC [38] recommends
areas of focus to include:
1. Necessity (of collection);
2. Proportionality (to broader realised benefits);
3. Transparency and accountability;
4. Implementation of privacy protections (such as staff training);
5. Flexibility (considering differing community views and privacy ex-
pectations);
6. Privacy by design; and
7. Privacy enhancing technologies.
A further step in planning a PIA-based approach to forensic DNA
phenotyping is to consider how it factors into a proposal to implement
MPS capabilities. Given the timeframes usually involved in purchasing
and validating a new MPS platform, there is argument for two separate
PIA processes or, at the very least, a refresh of the PIA prior to opera-
tional use. A PIA conducted too early and with too narrow a focus could
have limited relevance by the time the technology implementation is
complete. A PIA has been described as an ‘iterative process’ [37] and
there is considerable advantage in such a process running in parallel,
and closely aligned to, an agency’s implementation of forensic DNA phe-
notyping.
An important consideration in undertaking a PIA is who should lead
its development. A PIA process can be much improved by engaging the
right mix of personnel with scientific, legal, regulatory, governance, eth-
ical and privacy expertise. Inclusion of these skillsets, whether as au-
thors of a PIA or engaged stakeholders, would allow the final product to
thoroughly consider proposed uses of forensic DNA phenotyping in the
applicable legal and societal context. The exchange of ideas concerning
privacy and forensic DNA, and the sharing of PIAs themselves, will as-
sist.
3.1. Legal framework
Privacy laws vary between jurisdictions and, to provide a reasonably
adaptive discussion of the privacy challenges of forensic DNA phenotyp-
ing, the model PIA approach in this paper incorporates some considera-
tion of the privacy frameworks in Australia, the European Union, Japan
and the United States.
In the subsequent sections, we use the hypothetical introduction of a
forensic DNA phenotyping capability to work through the principle as-
pects of a PIA.
3.2. Assumptions and conceptual foundation
It is important to note that the PIA imagines privacy as an innate
human right, but one which must be viewed through a prism of legal
frameworks [41]. As such, a PIA must objectively balance the right to
privacy with competing societal interests. Clarke [42] notes that
[T]he PIA process is motivated by the need for public trust, and
is framed in terms of risk management…The evolution of PIAs
needs to be seen within the context of larger trends in advanced
industrial societies to manage risk and to impose the burden of
proof for the harmlessness of a new technology, process, service
or product on its promoters.
As a tool that seeks both to reassure the community and manage in-
herent risk, particularly in technology projects, an important question
is the level of specificity for a PIA [34]. Should it take a holistic or
an incremental approach to privacy? For a step-change in technology,
should it seek to make bold predictions about potential use or misuse? A
PIA should be forward-thinking, anticipate and comment on foreseeable
technological or procedural changes and make recommendations that
may pre-empt privacy concerns before they arise. Wright [43] outlined
sixteen steps in an optimised PIA approach. Important to this is identify-
ing the information flows and areas of privacy impact. In doing so, the
authors of a PIA must set parameters around how they see the technol-
ogy may operate. It is reasonable to anticipate or, indeed, recommend a
further PIA for future substantial shifts in the technology base, as well
as to seek to embed privacy awareness as a cultural imperative [43].
For forensic DNA phenotyping, the MPS platform itself has wide ap-
plication depending on the chemistry employed. It is therefore possible
for an MPS instrument to be configured between runs to provide en-
tirely different genetic information, to switch from identity markers to
phenotype markers, or to run both simultaneously [44].
Table 1 outlines some current and future genomic applications to
forensics, and acts as an example of how the scope of a PIA may be con-
strained by identifying different use cases which may range from a base-
line or current state to future speculated potential.
4. Technology description and informationflows
Forensic DNA phenotyping commences with the acquisition of ge-
netic material. This material is generally gathered by swabbing or sam-
pling material at a crime scene. The genetic sample is then analysed, cre-
ating genetic information in analogue or digital form. This raw genetic
information is then interpreted and distilled into information for com-
parison purposes (in the form of a genotype) or for forensic DNA pheno-
typing, interpreted and represented graphically, diagrammatically or as
predictive statements.
At times, the sample will contain genetic information from more
than one person. This could include an intimate swab from a victim,
which includes genetic material from both the victim and the suspect.
In the context of forensic DNA phenotyping, at least up until the point
when a victim’s genetic information can be compartmentalised, they
would maintain a personal privacy interest in genetic information, the
exploitation of which is not intended to identify attributes about them.
4.1. How is the genetic information collected?
Informed consent in relation to access to an individual’s genetic ma-
terial can raise ethical, scientific and technical issues [16,40]. Genetic
samples can come into law enforcement possession in several ways (see
Table 2), including voluntarily but also from abandoned DNA or from
material coercively obtained from suspects and offenders in accordance
with legislative powers.
Donors consent to the collection of their DNA only in limited cir-
cumstances. In doing so, there is often a power imbalance between the
state and the donor [12]. Questions concerning consent have seldom be-
come key issues in criminal proceedings using current identity-focused
DNA technology, as the use is generally quite limited to identification
purposes. Given that Forensic DNA Phenotyping requires more intru-
sive analysis, if a court were to consider consent from a privacy per-
spective, it may well be construed narrowly. This is similar to diag-
nostic medicine, where any ambiguity in patient consent would likely
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Table 1
Possible forensic applications of genetic targets.
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be interpreted as extending only to analysis reasonably necessary to pro-
vide effective diagnosis and treatment [23].
4.2. What genetic information is being held?
MPS technology provides highly granular genetic information, at the
base pair level, at selected targeted regions of an individual’s DNA. The
technique can analyse any fraction of the human genome and gener-
ates a significant amount of data for each sample processed, particu-
larly compared to current forensic DNA analysis employing capillary
electrophoresis. In Australia, genetic information is ‘sensitive informa-
tion’, and is further restricted as to secondary use [45]. The European
Union defines information about an individual’s health status as ‘data
concerning health’ [46]. The United States makes no such distinction,
although the requirement on agencies to ‘maintain in its records only
such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a purpose of the agency’ will be relevant in a genetic pri
vacy context [36]. A similar requirement applies in Japan, stipulating
that agencies ‘may retain Personal Information only when the retention
is necessary for performing the affairs under its jurisdiction provided by
laws and regulations’ [47]. In the selected sample jurisdictions, the in-
formation being collected would constitute information that attracts the
protection of relevant privacy laws.
4.3. Analysis and access to genetic information
While a laboratory introducing MPS would need to map their inter-
nal information flows to determine an optimal balance between privacy
concerns and efficient access to laboratory data, the actual laboratory
workflows associated with forensic DNA phenotyping are unlikely to be
significantly different to existing DNA analysis for identification pur-
poses. The quantum of data would be greater and, from a privacy per-
spective, its potential to reveal personal or sensitive information about
the donor is increased.
Privacy requirements concerning data security and disclosure there-
fore need to be more robust when dealing with forensic DNA phenotyp-
ing.
The resulting probabilistic phenotype predictions, in the form of a
written, graphical or illustrative representation of BGA and/or EVC, also
have privacy implications. The provision of information on likely ap-
pearance would appear consistent with similar collection of eyewitness
evidence. However, where either BGA or EVC prediction, or a combi-
nation, allows investigators to infer possible community or cultural ties,
and this intelligence is used as the basis to undertake further searches,
these additional searches could raise Fourth Amendment constitutional
issues in the United States [12,48]. This would particularly apply where
the genetic information identifies a particular community group, or
excludes other groups, but does not sufficiently individualise suspects
within that population. The use of genetic markers to identify health in-
formation, such as that a donor may suffer a medical condition requir-
ing a specific prescribed medication, will be discussed later.
4.4. Other information sharing
The specialised nature of forensic DNA phenotyping will likely en-
courage laboratories to offer testing to other organisations through a
service-based approach. Whether as part of broader inter-laboratory co-
operation or on a fee-for-service basis, it is therefore possible that sam-
ples or genetic information may be transferred between government lab-
oratories, or between government and private sector laboratories.
While an outsourced forensic model does not, of itself, raise inherent
privacy concerns if properly managed, there is the potential for genetic
information to be diverted into research programs or be transferred in-
securely between organisations. Medical and diagnostic testing has had
to grapple with similar issues and have established relevant guidelines
that could assist forensic laboratories considering an outsourced model
[49].
Transnational movement of samples and genetic information can
also be anticipated. There are requirements in most privacy laws with
respect to international transfer of personal information or personal data
[45,46]. The European Council adopted a resolution in 2001 concerning
transnational DNA results which, in part, encourages only the transfer
of ‘chromosome zones containing no genetic expression’ (i.e. identity
markers) [50].
4.5. Withdrawal of consent
As previously noted, DNA phenotyping of samples of known origin
adds no forensic value. However, at times, issues of withdrawal of con-
sent can apply, particularly when samples are later identified through
comparison with reference DNA.
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Table 2
Possible sources of genetic information and their status under selected privacy laws.







obtained Derived genetic information is…
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closely associated with an
individual (e.g. blood stain
believed to be from suspect in
custody; victim of crime)
Yes In some
cases
Yes Yes No No








obtained voluntarily Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
obtained coercively Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Withdrawal of consent by the donor of a genetic sample would likely
raise more privacy concerns and sensitivities in the context of the po-
tential use of forensic DNA phenotyping than traditional DNA analysis.
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [51] notes that
voluntary consent can be withdrawn at any time. Japanese privacy law
allows for suspension of use in certain circumstances [47]. While an in-
dividual volunteering genetic information may withdraw their consent
at any time, the practical effect of that withdrawal may vary depending
on other legislative, judicial or policy considerations.
There is potential for someone who volunteered a reference DNA
sample, perhaps a victim or witness, to later seek to withdraw con-
sent on the basis of concern that the reference sample could be used
to re-identify their genetic information collected at a crime scene and
possibly already subjected to MPS analysis. In considering the privacy
requirements, laboratories must be mindful of public trust. While de-
struction of a voluntary sample may not always be feasible, or legally
required, laboratories will need to be sensitive to this aspect in the con-
text of broader public debate about genomics and genetic privacy.
4.6. Access to personal information
Privacy laws frequently provide a right of access to an individual’s
own personal information or records. [36,45–47] In the case of forensic
DNA phenotyping, a right of access would be exercised when a donor
seeks to obtain a copy of any genetic information or resulting predictive
phenotype reports relating to them as donor of that genetic material.
Responding to a specific request from an individual for a copy of
their genetic information would not ordinarily raise privacy concerns.
The United States Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory, by way
of example, provides a simple one-page form for family members to re-
quest a copy of their mitochondrial DNA sequence after analysis.[52]
Laboratories have a corresponding duty to maintain security of personal
information, however. Workflow analysis, in a PIA context, must bal-
ance making information accessible and securing sensitive information
against unauthorised access or disclosure.
Donors could also become aware of genetic information in other
ways in the course of the use of probabilistic phenotype prediction. This
may result in the individual becoming aware of health information. If a
forensic laboratory undertook phenotype prediction specifically looking
for health information, so as to undertake particular investigative lines
of enquiry, it would be reasonable to assume the donor could ultimately
become aware of that information.
For example, consider an individual who provided a voluntary DNA
sample (with informed consent) only to later learn police were looking
for an individual matching their physical appearance who was likely
taking a certain medication for a debilitating genetic condition? It may
be that this represents the first time the individual becomes aware that
they carry the gene sequence predisposing them to that condition. Does
the ‘right to know’ or ‘right not to know’ for this person of interest dif-
fer if they were not involved in any crime, but had merely deposited
genetic material at a certain location, where a crime later occurred; of
if they were a suspect later exonerated; or if they were a suspect ulti-
mately convicted? Should laboratories pro-actively notify individuals of
health information, if they become aware of it as a result of Forensic
DNA Phenotyping?
The ‘right not to know’ is ascribed in the Universal Declaration on
the Human Genome and Human Rights [50]. In considering the privacy
implications of the use of probabilistic phenotype prediction, the likeli-
hood of an individual becoming aware of health information through a
criminal investigative process must be considered and balanced against
the law enforcement benefits of exploiting such technology.
A more vexed issue is that it is possible that predictive markers, or
any markers for that matter, thought to be informative only for BGA or
EVCs will later be found to be health informative. An individual who has
either specifically requested, or otherwise obtained, genetic information
arising out of forensic analysis, could inadvertently become aware of
health informative associations years later.
Lunshof et al. [18] challenges the absolutes with respect to consent
or privacy in a genetic context, instead highlighting an approach based
on risk. Informing individuals requesting copies of their genetic infor-
mation that the document they are seeking may contain information
that is health predictive, or will one day be health predictive, can assist
in a more sophisticated access regime for personal information. Provid-
ing information as to the risk or likelihood of that occurring would fur-
ther assist the individual to make their own decision as to whether they
wished to exercise what is often a legal right of access to their own per-
sonal information.
Concern may also be raised about any obligation on a laboratory to
self-initiate disclosure of personal information to an identified donor,
should the laboratory form the view that it does contain informa-
tion relevant to that individual’s health status or treatment [50,53]. A
scheme that foreshadowed proactive release would need to consider the
‘right not to know’ and potentially any need for genetic counselling
to ensure informed consent, potentially years before the information
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was known to be health informative.[14] An alternative approach is to
appropriately explain to individuals, at the point of reference sample
collection, that should the reference sample link to a crime scene sample
which – now or in the future – is shown to contain predictive informa-
tion, there would be no proactive disclosure of that information to the
donor.
4.7. Anonymity/Pseudonymity
Privacy laws in Australia include a specific requirement for entities,
where practical, to engage with individuals who wish to remain anony-
mous or to adopt a fictitious name or title. [45].
In the context of crime scene samples of unknown origin, the very
aim of forensic analysis is to identify and attribute identity to the sam-
ple. A forensic laboratory’s responsibilities within the criminal justice
system would generally prevent it from knowingly allowing other indi-
viduals, such as victims of crime, to provide DNA anonymously or under
a pseudonym, such that their real identity was not known.
5. Privacy risks and mitigation strategies
One approach, yielding the highest privacy safeguards, is to restrict
initial forensic DNA analysis to identity markers compatible with CODIS
or similar DNA databases, effectively entrenching current DNA technol-
ogy as a ‘baseline’ test. Predictive phenotyping would only be permit-
ted:
1. When analysis of DNA identity markers, and subsequent comparison
against DNA databases, yields no results; or
2. In a small number of cases where there is insufficient genetic mater-
ial to ensure that a second sample could be derived and run. In such
cases, identity marker analysis and forensic DNA phenotyping could
run concurrently (and, in many cases, on the same technology plat-
form).
Given the high percentage of cases where the victim and offender
are known to each other, and where phenotyping would present no ob-
vious advantage over traditional DNA analysis, such an approach offers
a high level of inherent privacy by design. [38,54]
In considering the privacy aspects of this approach, an evaluation of
privacy concerns must also consider whether de-identified genetic in-
formation may one day be re-identified. This tends to put genetic in-
formation into an unusual, although not unique, category when deal-
ing with de-identified personal information. Whether by investigative
action, or other means such as data aggregation and re-identification, it
may be possible to one day attribute unknown genetic information ob-
tained from a crime scene to an individual [55].
A privacy compliant approach must therefore build in an assumption
of re-identification, so that genetic information of unknown origin is ac-
corded the same level of security and used solely for its primary purpose
of collection: establishing the donor’s identity as an investigative lead.
5.1. New genetic markers
As previously discussed, a PIA would be incomplete if it did not con-
sider the strong likelihood that technology – and particularly MPS as-
says – will evolve over time. Individual laboratories may have little con-
trol over additional markers added by the instrument manufacturers in
future.
From a privacy perspective, it is important to consider what
processes should apply when new testing capabilities are made avail-
able, and how to ensure that privacy intrusion is considered against
any perceived investigative benefit. There may be a temptation to pro-
vide as much information about an unknown crime scene sample to in-
vestigators as possible. However, this could result in undermining pub-
lic confidence in the capability, raising concern amongst individuals and
perhaps resulting in a decrease in their willingness to cooperate with
police investigations [12]. This may well be the case if, as could reason-
ably occur, it is later found that the crime scene sample was deposited
not by a suspect but by an innocent passer-by, then subject to intensive
and intrusive genetic analysis. In the United States, analysis of discarded
genetic material does not generally raise Fourth Amendment concerns
[12]. However, the absence of appropriate safeguards and the likeli-
hood of re-identification of samples could give rise to argument that it
amounts, in some cases, to an unreasonable search. There are very real
policy benefits, therefore, in ensuring that privacy safeguards are main-
tained [20].
Privacy considerations also extend to the processes around report-
ing information derived from forensic DNA phenotyping to police inves-
tigators. This issue becomes increasingly sensitive if that reporting ex-
tends beyond predicting BGA and EVC. It is possible to imagine a ‘life
and death’ situation where investigators require full exploitation of ge-
nomic information from a crime scene sample to provide a time-critical,
comprehensive intelligence briefing. In these instances, the best balance
could be struck by forensic scientists working closely with investigators
to ensure that genetic information is understood in its predictive context
and as part of the totality of the evidence. Police and forensic scientists
must be critically aware of the potential for forensic DNA phenotyping,
like other forms of forensic evidence, to mislead if not considered in
context [56].
A viable safeguard against privacy intrusion and scope creep, but
equally valuable in guarding against the inadvertent misdirection of
police resources away from the real offender, would be establishing a
group of senior police officers and forensic scientists, similar to an ethics
board, to authorise release of less reliable or privacy intrusive predic-
tive information on a case by case basis. Such an approach would ensure
that the likely investigative benefit is clearly weighed against the pri-
vacy implications, particularly as the technology matures. Such a group
could ultimately make recommendations as to appropriate guidelines or
standards, together with stakeholders with interest in law, governance,
regulation, privacy and ethics.
While it may not be feasible to include external experts routinely
if decisions are being made on specific ongoing investigations, relevant
agencies should involve such individuals as well as drawing from the
medical science community, when formulating more enduring guide-
lines for the use of predictive phenotyping for law enforcement.
5.2. Wider use of genetic markers
A strictly limited approach to the use of genetic markers has sev-
eral shortcomings. As Murphy [54] explains, most crimes occur between
people who know each other. A sizeable proportion of DNA samples
processed each year by crime laboratories are reference buccal swab
samples from known individuals. As such, the limited approach assumes
laboratories are willing to ignore potential economies of scale from us-
ing phenotyping for a broader range of samples, ultimately reducing the
processing time and cost of DNA analysis, removing any requirement to
re-analyse samples, and thereby fulfilling other public policy benefits.
Privacy concerns could arise with a broader adoption of forensic
DNA phenotyping, including the potential for the MPS technology base
to be used for both crime scene and reference samples. Table 3 out-
lines the various source of genetic samples, and how they may interact
with various legislative privacy frameworks. If a laboratory elected to
use forensic DNA phenotyping on a wider range of samples than crime
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Table 3
Sources of DNA and EVC/BGA priority for analysis.





















closely associated with an
individual (e.g. blood
stain believed to be from
suspect in custody)
Yes Probabilistic Match Not relevant Yes Already identified
No Match Not relevant Yes Already identified
unknown origin No Probabilistic Match Not relevant Yes Already identified
No Match Relevant No Yes
Reference sample
obtained voluntarily Yes Not Applicable Not relevant Yes Already identified
obtained coercively Yes Not Applicable Not relevant Yes Already identified
scene samples of unknown origin, Table 3 also outlines how the status
of the personal information or data may change.
Given these factors, it would likely be necessary to consider options
to further mitigate privacy risks. This is consistent with the necessity
and proportionality factors outlined previously.
Demonstrating a strong and robust mitigation strategy for privacy
risks associated with genetic information held by law enforcement will
help to counter arguments for legislation governing the use of pheno-
type markers [57]. Moreover, any privacy assessment must consider
whether such expansive use is consistent with the consent given by
donors, and with coercive arrangements for DNA collection from sus-
pects and convicted offenders.
5.3. ‘Masking’ or encrypting personal information
If not strictly limiting DNA analysis to identity markers compatible
with CODIS or similar DNA databases, one approach to protecting per-
sonal information gained from phenotype markers – not presently rele-
vant to an investigation – would be to mask or encrypt the data, and to
reveal it only as investigative priorities dictate. The concept of encrypt-
ing genetic information is being considered across a number of health
care applications [58,59].
An ideal implementation of this safeguard would see an MPS plat-
form deliver results that are partially obfuscated to the scientist, as il-
lustrated in Table 4.
If analysis results in a full set of identity markers, uploading those
markers to the unsolved crime scene index of a national DNA database,
and returning no matches, could instead return an encryption key al
Table 4





Available Not available Not available Not available
lowing the scientist to unlock all or a portion of the remaining genetic
data, as illustrated in Table 5.
Such an approach, while providing a high degree of privacy protec-
tion and being consistent with accountability considerations, would re-
quire technical cooperation between laboratories, MPS manufacturers
and administrators of DNA databases such as CODIS.
A hybrid model could be implemented within a laboratory by seg-
menting data and making the full genetic output available only to se-
lected laboratory technicians. In a similar way, the technician could un-
mask the data, providing Supplementary information to forensic scien-
tists and, by extension, investigators. Tightly controlling and auditing
the access to genetic information from an MPS platform is, in any event,
highly desirable in any privacy-compliant implementation. Such a hy-
brid approach is also advantageous in that raw machine output is still
available to laboratory staff responsible for the MPS platform, for qual-
ity assurance and related purposes.
This is not entirely dissimilar to the approach proposed by the
United Kingdom Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric
Material to develop a ‘logical’ database separation of previously siloed
data, under appropriate governance and privacy safeguards [60]. The
common element of these approaches is the use of technology to provide
an overlay or safeguard to help manage access to personal information.
5.4. Information security, de-identification, re-identification and deletion
A privacy assessment must carefully consider information security
and security infrastructure requirements. With limited consent (and, in
some possible cases, coercive collection of DNA), the implications of loss
or misuse of genetic data would be severe [16]. Appropriate safeguards
should be implemented to ensure access to genetic data is limited, and
that the possibility of unauthorised access is minimised.
While commentators such as Kitchen [61] have suggested that po-
lice DNA databases will likely expand to include phenotype informa-
tion, such an outcome appears unlikely, at least in the context of disag-
gregated genetic information. The sharing between policing agencies of
Table 5
Unlocking BGA and EVC data after no criminal database match using identity markers.
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BGA and EVC predictions, in the form of an intelligence report, could be
beneficial in identifying repeat offenders across different cases and juris-
dictions. For example, one case may involve DNA evidence (generating
BGA and EVC information about a suspect who was likely to be of Euro-
pean background with green eyes and brown hair) and another case in
a neighbouring jurisdiction may have no DNA evidence but an eyewit-
ness who identified a person with those attributes. Coupled with other
investigative information, such as a common modus operandi, it may be
possible for investigators to hypothesise that the same offender may be
linked to both cases.
However, such intelligence sharing does not require phenotype
markers to be included in any criminal database. Intelligence in the
form of phenotype markers is only useful in so far as it leads investi-
gators to a suspect who could then obtain a conventional DNA profile
(using identity markers) from the suspect for comparison with database
records and/or crime scene biological evidence. Phenotype markers add
nothing of investigative value to existing national DNA databases of
identity markers. Identity markers are sufficient to link a crime scene to
another crime scene, or a suspect to a crime scene.
Sharing of genetic information would only appear to be beneficial to
aid in future research collaboration, such as to help identify new phe-
notype traits and thereby improve the capabilities of an MPS platform.
It is already routinely used for this purpose where voluntary donation
of DNA with informed consent for research is governed by the require-
ments of institutional ethics committees and scientific journals where
the Helsinki Declaration is generally accepted as a minimum standard
[62]. It has been suggested that uploading crime scene samples from
cases with clearly identified suspects amounts to a ‘backdoor’ to coer-
cive collection requirements. The erroneous upload of victim profiles
has also been documented [12]. This would suggest that quite robust
information security practices should be implemented to safeguard ge-
netic information, irrespective of the platform used for analysis.
The separation of genetic information from research samples, nec-
essary for validating and for enhancing MPS capabilities, from data de-
rived from criminal investigations would be an appropriate privacy safe-
guard. The consent arrangements around the collection of genetic infor-
mation for those purposes can be significantly distinct from those that
apply to research samples (Table 6).
Privacy legislation often relaxes information security requirements
when dealing with ‘de-identified’ personal information or data, in some
cases relaxing the purposes for which the data can be used [35,36,46].
The Federal DNA Identification Act of 1994, as an example, makes it law-
ful for the FBI to allow very limited access to de-identified genetic infor-
mation from their national DNA database for purposes such as popula-
tion statistics or research [12].
Table 6














Victim of crime Elimination No Possibly not
Bystander Elimination No Possibly not
Suspect–volunteer Comparison No Possibly not









However, there is a growing consensus that de-identification is a pri-
vacy enhancement and not a panacea [40]. As Anderson [63] explains, a
surprisingly small amount of personal information is needed to re-iden-
tify supposedly anonymous personal data: Anderson’s research showed
that 87 per cent of Americans could be uniquely identified using just
three pieces of information. Angrist [64] described work undertaken
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to demonstrate re-identifi-
cation of previously anonymised genetic profiles. Other commentators
demonstrated similar results [65,66]. Law enforcement samples may be
even more susceptible, given that – unlike an online genetic database −
an adversary could make certain assumptions that an individual (such
as a prominent suspect) are more likely to be within a given dataset.
Stanford University researchers recently demonstrated that it was
possible, in a high proportion of cases, to re-identify genetic information
associated with forensic DNA phenotyping by cross-referencing with
identification markers (short tandem repeats) [67]. Of particular note, it
was unnecessary to have an actual overlap of genetic information to use
as a data linkage. Such a data linkage (for example, post code and age
cross-referenced to name and date of birth) is the more common means
of successfully re-identifying disparate data holdings [63].
Commentators such as Culnane et al. [68] and Mittelstadt and
Floridi [40] have discussed options to criminalise the re-identification
of anonymised data, an approach recently proposed in Australia with re-
spect to certain government datasets [69].
A forensic laboratory releasing de-identified genetic data could
therefore quite easily find itself in a situation where a re-identification
attempt was successful. The familial aspect of genetic information adds
further privacy risks [70].
De-identification, however, can still be a useful mechanism for en-
hancing privacy. The separation of reference DNA profile information
can usefully create a data silo, where an inadvertent or malicious data
spill either results in the release of names, or genetic information, but
not both. The siloing of genetic information has been proposed by Hum-
bert et al. [65] with potential application across a range of biomedical
and public databases. While released information could still be re-iden-
tified, or could aid in re-identification of other publicly available genetic
information, this would require both a data spill and a second deliber-
ate, malicious step.
De-identification of genetic information may also be a legislative re-
quirement for certain samples. For example, in Australia, forensic DNA
profiles must be deleted or permanently de-identified in certain circum-
stances [71]. Given the risk of re-identification is demonstrably higher
when dealing with predictive DNA, a laboratory may need to err on the
side of actual deletion of genetic data, where possible.
The extent to which this is feasible depends on information flows
through each laboratory system. It should be noted that the physical de-
struction of data is a particularly difficult task, given the way modern
computer systems operate and the necessary backup regimes. A privacy
assessment would need to consider whether reasonable efforts to delete
data from a laboratory’s operational systems are sufficient, when cou-
pled with policies that would prevent inappropriate access to deleted
data, and note that there is a residual privacy risk if, for example, a de-
cision was made to restore a backup tape to access previously deleted
genetic information.
6. Conclusion
We have attempted to examine the context underpinning a PIA for
forensic DNA phenotyping. It explains the role that the PIA process can
play, as a contributor to ensuring legal compliance but also engaging
with the broader issues of public trust and confidence in forensic DNA.
A thorough and thoughtful PIA will significantly strengthen any imple
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mentation of new technology in a forensic setting, particularly where
there is a flow-on effect on individual privacy.
The article then goes on to draw out some of the key areas, within
the construct of a model PIA or ‘straw’ policy. By ensuring careful con-
sideration of information flows, consent and future applications, a ro-
bust privacy framework can be developed around this new technology.
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